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Abstract
This paper estimates the aggregate effect of government income transfer shocks for a sample 
of EU countries. The new measure of transfer shocks builds on a dataset by public fi nance 
experts of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The identifi cation strategy consists 
of a narrative analysis of the old-age pension-related policy actions reported in the ESCB 
dataset. Increases in old-age pensions are found to have a positive impact on aggregate 
expenditure components and employment consistent with a multiplier effect of between 0 
and 1.
Keywords: transfer payments, public pensions.
JEL classifi cation: E2, E62, H55, I38.
Resumen
En este trabajo se estima el efecto agregado de shocks a transferencias de renta 
gubernamentales para una muestra de países de la UE. La nueva medida de shocks a 
las transferencias utiliza una base de datos elaborada por expertos en fi nanzas públicas 
del Sistema Europeo de Bancos Centrales (SEBC). La estrategia de identifi cación consiste 
en un análisis narrativo de las medidas en política de pensiones de vejez recogidas en 
la base de datos del SEBC. Encuentro que aumentos en pensiones de vejez tienen un 
impacto positivo en componentes del gasto agregado y en el empleo coherente con un 
efecto multiplicador entre 0 y 1.
Palabras clave: transferencias de renta, pensiones públicas. 
Códigos JEL: E2, E62, H55, I38.
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1 Introduction
The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2008 has revived interest in the macroe-
conomic effect of public expenditures. As the recent crisis unfolded automatic sta-
bilizers responded and public finances deteriorated in many industrialized coun-
tries. This was particularly problematic for European economies and called for
the adoption of austerity measures since 2010. Both fiscal stimulus and austerity
programmes include important public expenditure measures, specifically govern-
ment income transfers. The recent average total public expenditures as percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP) for the EU is around 44%, and social transfers
account for more than 65% of this figure. Within social transfers, transfers other
than in kind have a larger share than transfers in kind, i.e. 55% and 45% respec-
tively.1 However, the question of what is the aggregate effect of government in-
come transfers shocks has received comparatively little attention in the literature.
This paper contributes to the existing literature estimating the aggregate effect of
government income transfers shocks using a panel dataset of 22 EU Member States
over the sample period 2007-2015. Specifically, I estimate the multiplier effect and
the response of aggregate expenditure components and labour market indicators to
changes in old age pensions.
Empirical evidence on the subject is scarce and has focused on the effects that
changes in income have on private consumption expenditures. In the framework
of the permanent income hypothesis, Poterba (1988) estimates that a $1 increase
1Average for 2006-2015. Oh and Reis (2012) document the composition of the increase in
public expenditures between 2007 and 2009 for the U.S. and arrive at a similar conclusion.
in transitory income due to the U.S. tax rebates of 1975 raised spending of non-
durables and services by about 12 to 24 cents. Wilcox (1989) finds that a predictable
10% increase in U.S. social security benefits raises durable goods purchases by 3%
in the same month. More recently, Romer and Romer (2016) construct a series of
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legislated increases in social security benefits in the U.S. from 1951 to 1991 and
study the effect of innovations to their narrative variable on private consumption.
They find that permanent benefit increases have a significant impact on consump-
tion upon impact. This paper complements parallel work in Pa´rraga-Rodrı´guez
(2016) and extends Romer and Romer (2016) work along two dimensions. First,
the set of outcome variables includes output, aggregate private consumption, in-
vestment, and several labour market indicators. Moreover, like Gechert, Paetz and
Villanueva (2016), a principal contribution of this research is an estimate for the
transfers output multiplier. Like Oh and Reis (2012) I look at a recent sample pe-
riod. However, while they focus on the expansionary side of fiscal policy actions
in the U.S. between 2007 and 2009, my economic unit of reference are European
countries and the sample period includes both stimulus plans and fiscal consolida-
tions.
Evidence at the household-level is much more prolific and indicates a positive re-
sponse of individual spending to increases in government income transfers. Japelli
and Pistaferri (2010) offer a good literature review on the subject. Relevant studies
include, for example, a pioneering quasi-experimental approach by Bodkin (1959).
He looks at the consumption response of WW-II veterans after the receipt of unex-
pected transfer payments in 1950, and finds a marginal propensity to consume non-
durables as high as 0.72. Hausman (2016) also looks at the consumption response
of U.S. veterans, but of WW-I, in a natural experiment setting. He finds that within
six months of receiving a large bonus in June 1936, veterans spent between 0.65 and
0.75 cents out of every dollar received, and that they spent a large fraction of their
bonus on cars, i.e. durable goods. Parker et al. (2013) exploit the randomization in
the assignation of Social Security numbers in the U.S. to estimate the effect of the
tax rebates of 2008 on households spending. They find that on average households
spent about 50 to 90 percent of their stimulus payments on durable goods (also
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mainly cars), and about 12 to 30 percent on non-durables consumption goods and
services in the quarter of the tax rebate. The estimated spending responses are the
largest for low-income, old age and borrowing constrained households.2 Finally,
Stephens (2003) investigates the response of household consumption expenditures
to the monthly arrival of social security checks in the U.S. He finds an increase in
the amount and probability of consuming food perishables and entertainment the
immediate days after receiving the checks. The results are even more significant for
those households for which social security transfers constitute their main source of
income.
Government income transfer shocks are constructed from a new and confiden-
tial dataset by public finance experts from the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB). The dataset contains detailed information on public revenue and expen-
diture policies for several EU Member States. Within government income trans-
fers, the data reports policy actions for old age pensions, unemployment benefits,
and a residual category for other transfers. This paper though estimates the ag-
gregate effect of government income transfers shocks using policy actions for old
2Johnson et al. (2006) study the effects of the 2001 tax rebates with similar findings.
age pensions. This restriction is primarily due to a lack of observations of discre-
tionary changes in unemployment benefits and, the difficult economic interpreta-
tion of estimates for other transfers due to the miscellaneous benefits included in
this category.3 The policy actions are reported with annual frequency following
standardised questionnaires in the context of regular projection exercises; the data
is harmonized across countries. The dataset defines a policy action as any change to
legislation which determines benefit entitlements. Furthermore, an interesting fea-
ture of this new dataset is that fiscal actions are measured as the difference relative
to a benchmark for what fiscal policy can be considered neutral. The ESCB dataset
compiles discretionary changes in fiscal policy.
3Other transfers include benefits such as family/children, sickness, exclusion, disability, and
housing, or health-care related transfers.
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The challenge for any study of the aggregate effect of fiscal shocks is the po-
tential endogeneity of policy actions. Policymakers take policies for a variety of
reasons. For example, during periods of high levels of inflation, governments may
increase income transfer payments to guarantee the purchasing power of their bene-
ficiaries. Another example is that in the event of a recession, extraordinary measures
may be needed to help a growing number of unemployed. Then, on many occasions
fiscal policy measures are responding to the current state of the economy. The key
identifying assumption to produce unbiased estimates of the aggregate effect of
transfers shocks is that discretionary changes in government income transfers are
exogenous. The ESCB dataset records discretionary changes in transfers. A contri-
bution of this paper is to reclassify these discretionary changes as either exogenous
or not exogenous based on their motivation. To do so I use information contained
in the descriptions accompanying all measures in the ESCB dataset. I complement
this information with several other sources, including country-specific legislation
and government reports, country reports by different international organizations,
and the occasional newspaper.
I find a multiplier effect between 0 and 1. The estimated old age pensions output
multiplier is 0.5 upon impact, with a maximum accumulated response close to unity.
Consistent with the existing literature (and household-level evidence) I also find a
larger effect on durable goods consumption than non-durables or services. The
response of investment is comparable to that of durables consumption. Moreover,
increases in transfers have a positive though modest impact on employment. To
gain insight into these results, estimates are also broken down by main motivation
behind the policy actions and for three geographic regions, i.e. North, South and
East Europe. Estimates breaking down policy actions by main motivation indicate
similar positive aggregate effects. Regarding regional estimates, I find that the point
estimates are only statistically significant for South Europe. Nevertheless, estimates
by region highlight that pooled estimates recover the average effect of transfers
shocks in EU Member States.
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An estimate of the transfers multiplier effect is crucial for assessing the effective-
ness of fiscal policy actions. A multiplier effect between 0 and 1 indicates limited
effectiveness of fiscal actions involving government income transfers. However,
this limited effectiveness might not have the same implications for stimulus and
austerity programmes. For example, the results indicate that increases in old age
pensions might be costly stimulus measures given their modest positive impact. On
the other hand, desirable austerity programmes should include measures that effec-
tively reduce the government deficit while having a contained negative effect on the
real economy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
ESCB dataset and the construction of the new measure of transfers shocks. Sec-
tion 3 gives details about the specification used for estimation. Section 4 explains
the main results in terms of the multiplier effect and investigates the transmission
mechanism of transfers shocks. Section 5 breaks down the estimates by motivation
and economic region. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 A New Measure of Transfers Shocks
A contribution of this paper is to construct a new measure of government income
transfers shocks. To do so I apply the narrative analysis pioneered by Romer and
Romer (2010) to a new dataset compiled by public finance experts from the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks (ESCB).
2.1 The ESCB Dataset
The ESCB dataset compiles discretionary changes of fiscal policy. The dataset de-
fines a policy action for old age pensions any change to legislation which determines
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benefit entitlements. Moreover, policy actions are measured as the difference rela-
tive to a ‘neutral policy’ benchmark for what policies can be considered to follow
the standard development. The benchmark for adjustments of pensions is to report
the measures in deviation from the price index of reference, once controlled for the
evolution of beneficiaries. The benchmark for reforms is a hypothetical counter-
factual of no change in the legislation. A measure due to a reform is defined as
the difference in expenditure from what this would have been absent the change in
the legislation. It is assumed that the dynamics of the item would have been flat,
or the same dynamics as in the previous year. Table A2 in the appendix summa-
rizes the policy actions and methods reported in the ESCB dataset by Spain. The
table includes the source, motivation, and description for all policy actions. Morris
and coauthors (n.d.) provide more examples for other countries. The estimates re-
ported in the ESCB dataset are based partly on official/external sources and partly
on estimates by the members of the public finance group. Estimates were produced
whenever the impact of a measure was not available, properly specified or the ac-
tual macroeconomic and/or demographic situation deviated significantly from the
assumptions made by the external source.
The EU Member States covered in this paper are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE),
Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), The Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Spain
(ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy
(IT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Malta (MT), The Netherlands (NL), Poland
(PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), and Slovakia (SK). The ESCB
dataset is not publicly available though and this paper cannot disclose data by coun-
try. The sample period spans from 2007 to 2015, both years inclusive. This con-
stitutes a panel dataset with 22 countries over 9 years. The ESCB dataset records
policy actions as the impact compared to previous year budget and expressed in
millions of national currency. To have a consistent variable across Member States,
the variables used for estimation are converted to millions of euros of 2015 and
expressed in per capita terms.
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Figure 1: Histogram of All Changes in Old Age Penions
Notes: Measures as percentage of previous period nominal GDP. All countries, 2007-2015.
Panel data offers regression analysis that the short time dimension of the dataset
rules out by country. Although the sample period is admittedly short, the sample
of countries and time period covered presents a rich amount of variation, essential
for adequate regression analysis. Figure 1 shows the heterogeneity present in the
sample with a histogram covering the entire sample of countries over the period
2007-2015. The measures range from less than -0.2 to more than 0.2 of GDP.
Around 43% of the observations are zero. However, there are also a significant
number of nonzero observations; there are more pension increases than pension
cuts.
The sign variation of the measures might reflect particularities of the sample pe-
riod. During the first years we find a number of measures taken as the result of the
generalization of the economic and financial crisis to the EU Member States. Since
2010, the EU Member States have implemented austerity programmes to deal with
inherited fiscal deficits, and to improve the confidence in their economies to reduce
borrowing costs. In some countries, long-run issues such as demographic trends or
an ageing population have also been dealt with. On the other hand, we also find in-
creases with an ideological motivation or as means to improve the welfare insurance
to vulnerable groups and individuals with low income throught the sample period.
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As explained earlier in the text, a number of fiscal policy actions can be argued
to be systematically related to the current state of the economy. In contrast, the
identifying assumption to produce unbiased estimates of the aggregate effect of
transfers shocks is that discretionary changes in old age pensions are exogenous.
The ESCB dataset records discretionary changes in transfers relative to a ‘neutral
policy’ benchmark. In other words, the compiled fiscal actions directly account for
developments in GDP, inflation, or more generally, the level of economic activity.
The next step is to identify the discretionary fiscal actions motivated by factors other
than a systematic response to the current state of the economy.
2.2 Narrative Analysis
The ESCB dataset also contains a description for all measures. The descriptions are
a valuable source of information about the motivation behind the transfers changes.
Whenever the descriptions are too short or imprecise, I complement this informa-
tion with the narrative record. Among others, I consulted country-specific legisla-
tion and government reports; several papers and reports on behalf of the European
Commission; and country reports by the IMF and the OECD. Occasionally, I also
consulted news from sources such as The Wall Street Journal or The Economist.
A full list of all complementary sources for the narrative analysis can be found in
the Appendix. The narrative analysis reclassifies the discretionary changes as either
exogenous or not exogenous assigning them to one of the following categories:
• Cyclical: This category includes changes in transfers consequence of current
macroeconomic developments. For example, changes in transfers to promote
short-run economic growth or to compensate for a tax hike or other public
expenditures cuts. Deficit reduction actions are also classified as cyclical
when they respond to short-run movements in the deficit or to offset another
shock.
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• Reform: The most clearly exogenous reforms are policy actions to deal with
demographic trends, or an ageing population. Following Cloyne (2013), this
category also includes deficit consolidation actions to guarantee the long-run
sustainability of public finances that were taken independent of the current
macroeconomic situation. ‘Reforms’ also include policy actions imposed on
policymakers by external bodies such as European rules or court rulings. I
also include reforms for efficiency gains such as combining different transfers
into a unique benefit, or to avoid incorrect receipt of benefits from those who
actually do not meet the eligibility requirements when they are not a clear
consequence of current macroeconomic developments.
• Purchasing Power: policy actions aiming to maintain and improve the pur-
chasing power and living standards of beneficiaries. Includes those changes
that, according to the established rule for adjustments, change transfers above
or below the price index of reference. Also includes discretionary changes in
transfers, usually targeted to low-income individuals, with the desire to in-
crease the insurance provided by the welfare system. In other words, changes
in transfers with an ideological motivation of fairness.4
‘Endogenous’ changes include policy actions motivated by cyclical reasons or
within a package of opposing fiscal measures. Changes motivated by the desire to
maintain the purchasing power of beneficiaries or due to a reform could be con-
sidered exogenous. Romer and Romer (2016) consider exogenous the changes in
U.S. social security benefits to keep up with past inflation, to increase the insurance
provided by the Social Security programmes, or due to computational mistakes.
Compared to them, my reclassification also includes changes in transfers motivated
by a structural reform or due to an ‘external’ imposition. Moreover, the reclassifi-
4Initially I broke down ‘Purchasing Power’ into changes motivated to keep up with inflation,
and changes motivated by the desire to increase the safety net of the social security. There were too
few observations per category though to have meaningful variables. Moreover, it could be argued
that the ultimate goal in both cases is to maintain and enhance the living standards of beneficiaries.
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cation follows a conservative approach that may over-classify the fiscal actions as
countercyclical. While reducing the accuracy of the point estimates, this is done
on the basis of obtaining unbiased estimates. From a total of 177 changes, I find
44 ‘endogenous’ changes and 133 ‘exogenous’. Within the later, 59 changes were
motivated by purchasing power reasons and 74 were the result of a reform.
2.3 Predictability Tests
If exogenous changes were in fact the response to other influences on output growth,
it is likely that these discretionary changes could be predictable by proxies for those
influences. This section tests this possibility following Romer and Romer (2010)
and, Mertens and Ravn (2012) strategy.
To test whether changes in transfers are predictable, I regress the discretionary
changes on their own lag and a lag of output, inflation, the unemployment rate, the
implicit Average Labour Tax Rate (ALTR), or the primary surplus. The selected
macroeconomic variables aim to capture short-run macroeconomic conditions in
each EU State Member. The regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Then, I compute the F-test under the null hypothesis that the macroeconomic vari-
ables do not Granger cause the discretionary changes in transfers.5 A high signif-
icance level implies that we cannot reject the null. Table 1 shows the p-value for
5Standard errors are clustered by country and are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial corre-
lation.
Table 1: Predictability Tests
Output Inflation Unemploy- ALTR Primary
ment rate surplus
All changes 0.28 0.68 0.23 0.36 0.47
Exogenous 0.38 0.88 0.19 0.54 0.56
Notes: p-values for Granger causality tests. A shorthand for the aggregate variable is stated at the
top. A shorthand for the transfer shock is stated on the left. Regressions include one lag of the
transfers shock and the selected aggregate. All regressions include country and year fixed effects.
Estimation is by least squares and standard errors are clustered by country. Sample 2007-2015.
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each test. The exogenous changes in old age pensions cannot be predicted by the
selected indicators. Moreover, excluding ‘endogenous’ changes improves the tests
results for several macroeconomic variables.
3 Econometric Framework
This paper estimates the aggregate effect of government income transfers shocks
using policy actions for old age pensions. In the context of the Dynamic Linear
Panel Regression Model consider the following baseline specification:
lnyit = αi+δt +ρlnyit−1+βΔTit + γXit + εit (1)
where the macroeconomic variable of interest yit for country i and year t is ex-
pressed in logs. The specification includes a lag of the dependent variable to cap-
ture dynamics in the relationship between transfers and the macroeconomic vari-
ables.6 ΔTit are the new measure of government income transfers shocks. The
transfer shocks measure discretionary changes in old age pensions relative to previ-
ous year and are expressed in millions of euros of 2015 and per capita terms. 100 ·β
measures the average percentage increase in a macroeconomic variable of interest
caused by a unit increase in old age pensions. αi is the unobserved heterogeneity,
δt year fixed effects. Xit is a set of control variables to be discussed below. Finally,
εit stands for the idiosyncratic error term.
6Estimation is by two-stage least squares and positions the lagged dependent variable with the
second lag of lnyit . I verified whether this is sufficient to control for the potential non-stationarity that
values of ρ close or larger than one imply. All estimates are well below unity, and figures 2-4 show
stationary dynamics. The inclusion of country fixed effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity,
and each dummy is absorbing the effects particular to each country.
Under double causality an estimate of β would be biased. The strategy to deal
with the potential endogeneity of ΔTit consists of applying a narrative analysis to
the measures compiled in the ESCB dataset. The new measure of government in-
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come transfer shocks is most likely to satisfy the identifying assumption that trans-
fers shocks are exogenous. First, the ESCB dataset compiles discretionary changes
relative to a ‘neutral policy’ benchmark. That is, the measures directly account
for short-run macroeconomic developments. Secondly, and most important, the
narrative analysis excludes from these discretionary changes those systematically
correlated with the current state of the economy.
Specification (1) also includes controls for other influences that might affect
both, the outcome variables and transfers changes at the same time but may not be
explicitly explained in the narrative record. Alternatively, we can think of the in-
clusion of control variables as a refinement to guarantee unbiased estimates. First,
I include government spending and the implicit ALTR (inclusive of social security
contributions) to control for spending in other public expenditures and how dis-
cretionary changes in transfers are financed. The Appendix presents results from
regressions that use alternative variables to control how discretionary changes in
transfers are financed.7 Secondly, several changes in old age pensions correspond
to inflation adjustments. Discretionary changes in transfers are measured in devi-
ation to the standard evolution of prices in each country, but accidental correlation
with other factors that affect both, the outcome variables and the changes in pen-
sions due to inflation is always a possibility. Then, it seems important to include
the lag of the price level in the regressions.8 Moreover, the set of controls also in-
cludes a proxy for the monetary policy stance. The majority of countries belong to
the Euro-area and have their interest rate of reference set by the European Central
Bank. However, Slovakia is a Euro area member since 2009, while Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania have their interest rate of reference
7The implicit ALTR is defined as total taxes on employed labour (Eurostat’s series D51A C1,
D29c and D611) divided by compensation of employees (Eurostat’s series D1) plus total wage bill
and payroll taxes (Eurostat’s series D29c). Government spending stands for the sum of intermediate
consumption, gross fixed capital formation and compensation of employees of the general govern-
ment (data from Eurostat).
8Series from Eurostat, All items HICP (2015=100).
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set by their respective national central bank.9 Finally, under the assumption that
changes in international confidence are a common shock to all countries, they are
captured in the year fixed effects. Any country-specific fixed deviations from the
international sentiment would be captured in the country fixed effects.
The macroeconomic variables of interest are output, non-durables goods con-
sumption, services consumption, durable goods consumption, and private invest-
ment. All variables are in real and per capita terms.10 I also investigate the effect
of transfers shocks to selected labour market indicators, which include employment
per capita, hours per worker, the unemployment rate and the real wage.11 The mea-
9Source: international financial statistics (IMF). Euro-area, Slovakia and Bulgaria interest rate
of reference correspond to the Central Bank Policy Rate. The Czech Republic and Poland interest
rate is the Repurchase Agreement Rate. The interest rate of reference for Hungary and Romania
corresponds to the Discount Rate.
10Output corresponds to gross domestic product at market prices (Eurostat’s national accounts).
Consumption aggregates are retrieved from Eurostat’s final consumption aggregates by durability at
market prices of non-durable goods, durable goods and services. Private investment corresponds to
gross fixed capital formation at current prices of the private sector (AMECO series UIGP). Nominal
variables are deflated with the HICP base 2015. Variables are converted in per capita terms dividing
by total population (Ameco series NPTD). Data last retrieved in April 2016.
11Employment per capita corresponds to total Employment (Ameco series NETD) divided by
population; Hours per worker correspond to average annual hours worked per person employed
(Ameco series NLHA) divided by 52; the unemployment rate corresponds to the Eurostat series
une rt a; the real wage is nominal compensation per employee of the total economy (Ameco series
HWCDW) divided by the HICP.
sures of transfers shocks are available at annual frequency from 2007 to 2015. The
rest of variables are available from 2005.
4 The Aggregate Effect of Transfers Shocks
I start estimating specification (1) for output as the outcome variable. Figure 2
shows the response of output to an increase in old age pensions. Multiplier effects
are obtained with a shock to old age pensions equivalent to the value of 1 percent
of median GDP in the sample, and normalized by the ratio of GDP-to-old age pen-
sions. The plot also reports bootstrap computed confidence intervals at the 95 and
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68 percent confidence level.12 Transfers shocks for the baseline specification are
the narrative variable including only exogenous changes in old age pensions (black
lines).
The estimated multiplier effect for the baseline specification is between 0 and 1.
On impact, output rises 0.45 percent. Thereafter, the effect of transfers shocks also
includes the effect through lagged output. After one year, about half of the initial
effect has faded and the multiplier takes the value of 0.25 percent. After three years
the multiplier is statistically not different form zero. An alternative measure of the
long run effect of transfer shocks would be the long run cumulative multiplier. This
can be calculated as the sum of the impact responses of output until the effect of the
shock dies out.13 The estimated long run multiplier effect is close to 1.
In line with Pa´rraga-Rodrı´guez (2016), using all discretionary changes overesti-
mates the short-run effect of transfer shocks on output (circle marker). Output rises
0.54 percent upon impact, however, the multiplier is not statistically different from
zero by the third year. The resultant long run multiplier effect is slightly above unity
and takes the value of 1.1 percent. The sign of the bias suggests a positive correla-
tion between the estate of the economy and changes in old age pensions. Estimates
that use all discretionary changes could be attributing to increases in transfers what
in reality would be the result of concealed factors associated with better financ-
ing capacity. The estimates do not differ significantly though. This could reflect
the pre-treatment of policy actions in the ESCB dataset because policy actions are
measured relative to a ‘neutral policy’ benchmark.
12Robust standard errors to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are clustered by country.
The confidence interval for the impact responses are equivalent to adding or substracting 1 or 2
standard deviations. Thereafter, confidence intervals are computed from 10,000 draws of β and ρ
from a bivariate normal distribution with mean and covariance matrix equal to the point estimates
and covariance matrix of the regression coefficients.
13Formally, m= ∑∞t=0ρ tβ =
β
1−ρ , where m denotes the long run multiplier.
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As a robustness check, I also present estimates for an alternative measure of the
shocks based on the residuals of regressing all discretionary changes in transfers on
a constant and a lag of output (gray line). That is, the alternative measure of transfer
shocks removes predictable responses to output from the discretionary changes in
transfers. The point estimates for this alternative measure are below the baseline
estimates the entire forecast horizon. Output increases 0.40 percent upon impact,
and the long run multiplier effect is 0.6 percent. However, the differences are not
statistically significant either.
comparison in all cases). In parallel work I estimate the dynamic aggregate effect
of innovations to social security benefits in the U.S. during the period 1951-2007.
There I find an impact multiplier of 0.2, which rises to an accumulated response of
At this point it is imperative a comparison with other estimates of the multiplier
effect in the existing literature (although these measures do not afford a one-to-one
years
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Figure 2: Dynamic Response of Output to Transfers Shocks
Notes: Response to an increase in old age pensions equivalent to 1 percent of GDP. Transfer shocks
are the narrative variable including only exogenous changes (black), all changes (marker), or resid-
ualized (gray). Full lines are point estimates; thin and broken lines indicate one and two standard
deviations confidence intervals respectively.
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1.0 after four quarters and reaches a maximum value of 2.2 in the long run. With
the same methodology, Gechert, Paetz and Villanueva (2016) estimate a multiplier
effect of shock to social security in Germany between 0 and 1. Gechert, Paetz and
Villanueva (2016) point out that the different estimates for U.S. and European data
could be due to a higher ratio of imports-to-GDP in Europe compared to the U.S.
Other comparable estimates are those for the tax multiplier. The following estimates
are based on U.S. data. In the SVAR tradition and for total tax revenues, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) find a peak multiplier of 0.8. Using sign restrictions in an SVAR
framework, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) also estimate the effect of aggregate taxes
and find an impact multiplier of 0.3, which rises to 0.9 after one year and reaches a
maximum value of 3.4 after twelve quarters. Romer and Romer (2010) construct a
narrative variable of legislated tax changes in the U.S. and estimate that a tax hike
of 1 percent of GDP has a small and not statistically significant effect on output on
impact, but maximum effect of 3.1 percent after ten quarters. Mertens and Ravn
(2013) estimate the proxy SVAR for personal income taxes and find a multiplier
of 2.0 on impact, rising to a maximum of 2.5 in the third quarter. Finally, Ramey
(2011) literature survey sets the range of estimates for the government spending
multiplier from 0.6 to 1.8.
4.1 Aggregate Expenditure Components
Government income transfers affect the macroeconomy through changing the dis-
posable income of households and their spending decisions. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to study the effect of transfers shocks to different expenditure components to
better understand the point estimates for the output multiplier. To this end, the next
outcome variables are aggregate private consumption of non-durables, services and
durables, and aggregate private investment.
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to 1 percent of GDP. The plots also report 95 and 68 percent confidence intervals.
An increase in old age pensions yields a positive effect on all three aggregate con-
sumption components. The larger response of durable goods consumption, 0.58
percent, than non-durables, 0.33 percent, or services, 0.19 percent, is in line with
the existing literature. Evidence at the household-level predicts a larger response of
durables than non-durables purchases to increases in disposable income.14 More-
over, Romer and Romer (2016) and Pa´rraga-Rodrı´guez (2016) find that innovations
to social security benefits trigger a larger response of durables purchases than non-
durables consumption in the US. However, the estimates for durables and services
consumption are only significant at the 68 percent confidence level and transfer
shocks have a longer lasting effect on non-durables consumption. On the other
hand, private investment rises 0.99 percent upon impact. Standard theory of the
effect of public expenditure shocks predicts crowding out effects. However, un-
like government spending, transfers do not compete directly with private spending.
Government income transfers indirectly affect aggregate demand through redistri-
bution. Moreover, this strong response of investment is in line with other estimates
of the response of investment to tax shocks (see Romer and Romer 2010). The
estimates though are also imprecisely estimated; confidence intervals are wide on
impact and, thereafter, the point estimates are not significant at the 95 percent con-
fidence level.
Figure 3 shows the dynamic response of aggregate expenditure components to
an exogenous increase in old age pensions. The shocks are scaled to be equivalent
14See, for example, Parker et al (2013, 2006), Souleles (1999).
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Figure 3: Dynamic Response of Aggregate Expenditure Components to Transfers
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Figure 4: Dynamic Response of Labour Market Indicators to Transfers Shocks
Notes: Response to an exogenous shock to old age pensions equivalent to 1 percent of GDP. Full
lines are point estimates; thin and broken lines indicate 68 and 95 percent confidence intervals
respectively.
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4.2 Labor Market Indicators
Evidence on the aggregate effect of public expenditures shocks to the labor market
is scarce and has focused on the effect of government spending shocks.15 As an
exception, Romer and Romer (2016) estimate with US data the effect of permanent
increases in social security benefits on employment. This section complements
parallel work in Pa´rraga-Rodrı´guez (2016) and extends the outcome variables to
include hours per worker, the unemployment rate, and the real wage. The labour
market indicators represent the extensive, intensive margins of labour, and a mea-
sure of labour costs.
Figure 4 shows the dynamic response of the selected labour market indicators to
an increase in old age pensions. The shocks are scaled and equivalent to 1 percent
of GDP. The plots also report 95 and 68 percent confidence intervals. An increase in
old age pensions has a positive effect on employment and the unemployment rate.
This is consistent with the point estimates for the output multiplier and aggregate
expenditure components. On the other hand, the response of hours is virtually zero
and not significant. The estimates also indicate that increases in transfers are wage
inflationary. The real wage rises 0.21 percent upon impact and the response is quite
persistent. Overall though, and like Romer and Romer (2016) or Pa´rraga-Rodrı´guez
(2016), the size of the estimates is modest or imprecisely estimated.
15See Monacelli et al (2010), Ravn and Simonelli (2007), Chodorow-Reich et al (2012) and
references therein.
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5 Estimates by Motivation and Different Regions
5.1 Different Motivations
The narrative analysis has highlighted the different motivations for transfers changes.
The criteria used to reclassify the discretionary changes in transfers established
three main motivations: changes in transfers motivated by cyclical conditions, due
to a reform or, aiming to sustain and improve the living standards of their bene-
ficiaries. Transfers changes in the last two categories are considered exogenous.
Reforms include policies to guarantee the long run sustainability of public finances,
for efficiency gains or as a result of an external imposition on policymakers. ‘Pur-
chasing power’ measures include those changes that, according to the established
rule for adjustments, change transfers above or below the price index of reference.
This category also includes changes with an ideological motivation of fairness or
equity. However, changes associated with structural reforms usually involve trans-
fers cuts while changes to improve the purchasing power of the beneficiaries usually
involve increases. As a result, we might expect different effects from discretionary
changes by motivation. This section investigates whether this is the case.
Table 2 presents the results. To help in the comparison, I reproduce again es-
timates for the narrative variable which includes exogenous changes due to both
motivations. The selected dependent variables summarize the aggregate effect of
transfers shocks and include output, total private consumption expenditures, private
investment, and employment per capita.16 Again, the coefficients correspond to the
16Total aggregate consumption corresponds to the sum of non-durables, durables and services
effect of an increase in old age pensions equivalent to one percent of GDP. Robust
standard errors are in brackets and clustered by country. Comparing the second and
consumption.
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Table 2: The Aggregate Effect of Transfers Shocks by Motivation
Output Consumption Investment Employment
Purchasing Power 0.55 1.01 2.13 0.38
(0.56) (0.40) (0.93) (0.22)
Reform 0.46 0.21 0.89 0.11
(0.14) (0.08) (0.48) (0.06)
All Exogenous 0.45 0.29 0.99 0.13
(0.13) (0.11) (0.49) (0.07)
Notes: A shorthand for the dependent variable is stated at the top of each column. A shorthand for the transfers
shocks is stated on the left. The regressors include the lagged dependent variable, instrumented with the second
lag. All regressions include country and year fixed effects; also include controls for monetary and tax policy.
Estimation is by two-stage least squares and standard errors are clustered by country. The sample period is
2007-2015.
third row in Table 2, the baseline point estimates are close to estimates which only
include ‘reform’ changes. This indicate that the baseline estimates might be mainly
driven by changes due to reforms. On the other hand, estimates for ‘purchasing
power’ changes have large standard errors. This imprecision though could be partly
attributed to the lower number of observations in this category. Nevertheless, once
accounted by the larger standard errors for the ‘purchasing power’ category, the
point estimates for either motivation indicate similar positive aggregate effects.
Table 3: Multiplier Effect by Region
Baseline South North East
Impact effet 0.45 0.25 0.00 0.43
(0.13) (0.03) (0.30) (0.79)
Long-run effect 1.0 0.8 0.0 1.0
Notes: A shorthand for the region is stated at the top of each column. The re-
gressors include the lagged dependent variable, instrumented with the second
lag. All regressions include country and year fixed effects; also include con-
trols for monetary and tax policy. Estimation is by two-stage least squares and
standard errors are clustered by country. The sample period is 2007-2015.
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ratio of GDP-to-old age pensions. To help in the comparison I reproduce again the
baseline estimates for the pooled sample. The multiplier effect is the strongest in
East Europe, while it is virtually zero in North Europe. The point estimates for these
regions though have large standard errors and should be interpreted with caution.
On the other hand, the output response is statistically significant for South Europe.
An increase in old age pensions triggers a lower impact effect in South Europe
compared to the baseline, however, the shock is more persistent and the resultant
long-run multiplier effect of 0.8 is similar to the baseline estimates.18
5.2 Different Regions
This section relaxes the assumption of a single slope coefficient in specification (1)
and presents estimates for the output multiplier in different regions. Pooled esti-
mates measure the average effect of transfer shocks in EU Member States. How-
ever, the sample of countries presents differences like the degree of openess, the
share of social expenditures or the number of retirees per capita that might affect
the multiplier effect of transfers shocks. I establish three regions in line with Eu-
roVoc’s definition of sub-regions in Europe. A Northern or continental region for
AT, BE, DE, FR, FI, LU, NL. A Southern or Mediterranean region formed by CY,
ES, GR, IT, PT, SI. The remaining countries form an Eastern European region: BG,
CZ, HU, LV, PL, RO, SI, SK.17
Table 3 compares the multiplier effect across regions caused by an identical
increase in old age pensions in all regions. The shock to transfers is scaled to
be equivalent to the value of 1 percent of median GDP, and normalized by the
17IE, and MT are excluded due to a lack of variation in discretionary changes for old age pen-
sions.
18As described earlier in the text, long-run effects are computed as the sum of output responses.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has provided evidence on the aggregate effect of government income
transfers shocks using a panel dataset of 22 EU Member States during 2007-2015.
A contribution of this paper is the construction of a new measure of transfers shocks
based on a dataset by public finance experts of the ESCB. The ESCB dataset records
discretionary changes in old age pensions relative to a ‘neutral policy’ benchmark.
A narrative analysis reclassifies these discretionary changes as either exogenous
or not exogenous, i.e. a systematic response to the current state of the economy,
according to their motivation.
A principal contribution of this paper is an estimate for the output transfers mul-
tiplier. The estimated old age pensions output multiplier ranges between 0 and 1. I
also find a positive and significant effect of transfers shocks to aggregate expendi-
ture components. On the other hand, the estimates indicate a positive though modest
effect on the labour market. Estimates were also broken down by main motivation
behind the policy actions and for three geographic regions, i.e. North, South and
East Europe.
Finally, these results have important policy implications. A multiplier effect be-
tween 0 and 1 indicates limited effectiveness of fiscal actions involving transfers.
However, this limited effectiveness might not have the same implications for stimu-
lus and austerity programmes. On the one hand, the results indicate that increases in
old age pensions might be costly stimulus measures given their modest positive im-
pact. On the other hand, desirable austerity programmes should include measures
that effectively reduce the government deficit while having a contained negative
effect on the real economy. To draw stronger conclusions a larger panel either in
terms of time span and/or number of countries seems the most promising way.
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A2 Policy Actions in Spain
Next table summarizes the source, motivation, and description for all Spanish policy actions reported in the fiscal ques-
tionnaires between 2007 and 2015. The implementation year and descriptions are directly taken from the fiscal question-
naires; all remaining information builds on the data reported in the questionnaires.
Year Source Policy action Motivation Notes and Methodology
2007 General State
Budget Law
42/2006, 28
December
Improvement in minimum pensions, with an in-
crease of 4.5% if the pensioner has a dependent
spouse, 3% if he/she does not and 1 point for
SOVI (compulsory old-age and disability insur-
ance) pensions. These in addition to a 2% increase
corresponding to the expected change in the CPI.
Purchasing
power
The benchmark for indexation of pensions is the rate
of CPI inflation from November t-1 to November t.
A measure is defined as the legislated pension
increases above (below) this benchmark, multiplied
by total expenditure in t-1. Minimum pensions have
more often a final adjustment (including deviations
of the expected change in the CPI from realized
inflation) that deviate from the rate of CPI inflation.
2008 General State
Budget Law
51/2007, 26
December
Improvement in minimum pensions, with an in-
crease of 6.5% if the pensioner has a dependent
spouse, 5% if he/she does not, and 22.3% if the
pensioner is a widower with family obligations.
1% increase of SOVI pensions above the expected
change in the CPI.
Purchasing
power
Year Source Policy action Motivation Notes and Methodology
2009 General State
Budget Law
2/2008, 23
December
Improvement in minimum pensions, with an in-
crease of 3% in addition to the increase due a de-
viation of the forecast from real inflation in the
previous year. The rise is equivalent to addi-
tional 15 euros per month to minimum pensions
for pensioners with dependant spouse, and pen-
sioners that constitute a single economic unit of
survivors, retirement or disability pensions. Guar-
anteed purchasing power to other pensioners with
an increase of 2%, together with an increase due
to a deviation of the forecast from real inflation in
the previous year.
Purchasing
power
The benchmark for indexation of pensions is the rate
of CPI inflation from November t-1 to November t.
A measure is defined as the legislated pension
increases above (below) this benchmark, multiplied
by total expenditure in t-1. Minimum pensions have
more often a final adjustment (including deviations
of the expected change in the CPI from realized
inflation) that deviate from the rate of CPI inflation.
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2010 General State
Budget Law
26/2009, 23
December
Improvement in minimum pensions, with an in-
crease of 2% on average for all minimum pensions
from the Social Security and SOVI. The increase
is equivalent to 15 euros per month for pensioners
with dependent spouse or that constitute a single
economic unit.
Purchasing
power
2010 Royal
Decree-
Law 8/2010,
20 May
Withdrawal of transitory regime for partial retire-
ment
Reform The benchmark is the hypothetical counterfactual of
no change in the legislation. The measure is defined
as the difference in expenditure from what this would
have been absent the change in the legislation. Esti-
mation from official source. Policy action due to an
external imposition: “[...] speed, security and deter-
mination in action is part of the commitment of the
member countries of the euro zone to strengthen con-
fidence in the single currency and the stability of the
euro zone.”
Year Source Policy action Motivation Notes and Methodology
2011 Royal
Decree-
Law 8/2010,
20 May
Pensions freeze. Reform Legislation implies measures to reduce the public
deficit due to an ’external’ imposition: ”The measures
outlined require the adoption of a legal rule. The need
for immediate application in some cases, to ensure
their effectiveness in reducing spending, and its real-
ization, knowledge and security in other, so that their
credibility and immediate effect on financial transac-
tions and the relevant actions to guarantee for the sta-
bility of the euro [...].”
2012 Royal
Decree-
Law 20/2011,
30 December
No adjustment in pensions for the deviation of
forecast from real inflation in the previous year.
Reform Measures to reduce the public deficit due to an ‘ex-
ternal’ imposition: “Spain was granted an additional
year, until 2014, to bring the deficit below 3% also
modifying the deficit targets of the intervening years.
This concession did not mean at all a relaxation but,
on the contrary, a tightening of fiscal consolidation
efforts” (Stability Programme 2013-2016).
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2013 General State
Budget Law
17/2012, 27
December
Increase of pensions above CPI, with an increase
of 1% for all pensions.
Cyclical Percentage increase retrieved from the presentation
project of the General State Budget. Increase in com-
pensation for no adjustment due to a deviation of ex-
pected change in the CPI from real inflation in the
previous year. In a press conference, 30th November
2012, vice-president Soraya Senz de Santamara said:
“We are well aware that you cannot ask all pensioners
the same effort and that we must discuss the matter
[no adjustment in pensions] with fairness, hence, in
January 2013 pensions will be increased, in general,
1 percent, but 2 percent for pensioners who earn less
than a thousand Euros.”
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A3 Alternative Controls for Fiscal Policy
Figure A1 presents estimates for multiplier effect and alternative controls for fis-
cal policy. The controls include the primary surplus (line with marker), and in-
terest payments of outstanding debt (gray line). The primary surplus is defined as
net lending/borrowing of general government (Eurostat’s series B9) minus inter-
est payments (Eurostat’s series D41 PAY). To help in the comparison, black lines
reproduce baseline estimates discussed in the main text. Figure A1 also includes
estimates without controls for monetary or fiscal policy (thin black line) though all
regressions include country and year fixed effects. The differences between coeffi-
cients are not statistically significant and range from 0.39 to 0.50 upon impact.
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Figure A1
Notes: Response to an exogenous shock in old age pensions equivalent to 1 percent of GDP. Full
lines are point estimates; broken lines indicate 68 percent confidence interval for baseline estimates.
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